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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This case is governed by the plain language of the lease renewal option. That 
provision requires the option rent to be "at a market rate mutually agreed upon" by the 
parties. (Addendum to Brief of Appellant, hereafter "Add.," at 29.) Little Caesar 
concedes the absence of any agreement, but argues that the district court properly set the 
rent at the maximum "Minimum Rent." However, "Minimum Rent" is only one 
component of the total "market rate" for the option period. Because the parties never 
agreed on the "market rate," the option is void and unenforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE OPTION PROVISION DOES NOT SPECIFY A RENTAL 
RATE WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY AND DEFINITENESS TO 
BE ENFORCED. 
In its opening brief, Bell Canyon applied long-established Utah law to demonstrate 
that the option provision is void and unenforceable because it left the rental rate to future 
agreement of the parties, and the parties reached no agreement. (Br. of App. 7-15.) Little 
Caesar does not dispute the law, but argues that the terms of the option are sufficiently 
certain for enforcement without agreement of the parties. (Br. of Aplee. 8-16.) However, 
that argument ignores the plain language of the option provision requiring agreement on a 
"market rate." 
A. Language of Option Provision. 
The rental terms of the option provision, quoted verbatim below, plainly require 
mutual agreement on a "market rate" for the option period: 
The Minimum Rent for the first option period shall be at a market rate 
mutually agreed upon bv Tenant and Landlord. In the first option period, 
the Minimum Rent shall not be higher than $ 11.00 per square foot. Rent in 
the second option period shall also be at market rates. Market rates shall be 
at the then prevailing market rates for similar space in similar shopping 
centers within 5 miles of the Shopping Center. Landlord and Tenant shall 
mutually agree on the market rate within 30 days of Tenant's notification to 
Landlord that Tenant wishes to exercise an option period. [Add. 29, f^ 4, 
emp. added.] 
The term "market rate" in a commercial lease contemplates two separate components, one 
for "Minimum Rent" based on square footage, and a second for percentage rent based on 
sales. That explains the two separate, plural references to "market rates," one for 
minimum rent and one for percentage rent. As a protection to the tenant, the first 
component, "Minimum Rent," was set at a maximum of $11 per square foot for the first 
option period. However, that figure plainly was not intended as the total option rent, or 
the remaining references to future agreement on a "market rate," as well as the definition 
of "market rates," would be rendered superfluous. 
Little Caesar's entire argument is based on its strained interpretation of the term 
"Minimum Rent" in the option provision. (Br. of Aplee. 8-9.) Little Caesar reasons that 
because paragraph 3 of the Lease Addendum reduced "minimum rent" to $1,190 "for the 
remainder of the existing Lease term." and the original Lease also set "Basic Monthly 
Rent" at $1,190, the terms "minimum rent" and "Basic Monthly Rent" must mean the 
same thing. However, even if accepted, that argument proves nothing because both terms 
refer to the basic component of rent to which a percentage component may be added. 
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(See Lease definitions: "Percentage Rent" is calculated separate from, and in addition to. 
"Basic Monthly Rent.") Therefore, even if the term "Minimum Rent" in the option 
provision referred to "Basic Monthly Rent," it would still allow for addition of a 
percentage component to reach a mutually agreed "market rate" for the option period. 
Moreover, as indicated, the language cited by Little Caesar in paragraph 3 of the 
Lease Addendum refers to the rental rate during the existing Lease term, while paragraph 
4 contains the rental provisions for the future option terms. While the original Lease 
specifically provides for "zero" percentage rent during the initial term, the option 
provision contains no such limitation, thus allowing for percentage rent in addition to 
"Minimum Rent" during the option period. 
Little Caesar cites Cummings v. Rytting, 207 P.2d 804 (Utah 1949), for the 
proposition that nonapplication of percentage rent in the original Lease precluded any 
percentage rent during the option period. (Br. of Aplee. 13.) However, that case, which 
has never been cited by a court, stands for no such thing. Cummings dealt with an option 
provision that said only, "With a five year option," with no mention of option terms and 
no contemplation of any required future agreement or lease document. Id. at 805-06. 
Accordingly, the court enforced the lease option on the same terms as the original lease. 
Id. By contrast, in the present case, the option provision specifically requires the rental 
rate for the option period to be renegotiated and set "at a market rate mutually agreed 
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upon by" the parties. Therefore, the option rental rate is neither fixed nor limited by the 
terms of the original lease. 
Little Caesar quotes language from the option provision out of context to support 
its faulty interpretation, as follows: "Monthly rent during the first option period 'shall be 
at a market rate mutually agreed upon by Tenant and Landlord,' but 'shall not be higher 
than $11.00 per square foot.'" (Br. of Aplee. 10.) Nowhere does the option provision 
state that monthly rent for the option period shall not be higher than $11 per square foot. 
Rather, it states that "the Minimum Rent shall not be higher than $11.00 per square foot." 
(Emp. added.) The option provision expressly requires "mutual agreement" on two 
separate "market rates": First, the "market rate" for the "Minimum Rent," for which the 
option contains the $11-maximum; and second, the "market rate" for the total rent, which 
was to be determined within 30 days after notice of exercise of the option. (Minimum 
rent + percentage rent = total rent.) Accordingly, the $11-rate cited in the option is not 
the maximum total rent for the option period, but the maximum "Minimum Rent," or base 
rent, for the period. The parties, and the court, are bound by the actual language of the 
option, not by Little Caesar's selective (and deceptive) misquotations of the language. 
Little Caesar argues that a percentage rent component cannot apply during the 
option term because the percentage rent provisions in the initial Lease were deleted. (Br. 
of Aplee. 11-13.) However, the percentage rent section of the Lease (section 4.3) was 
marked "deleted" during the initial term only because "Percentage Rent" was set at 
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"zero" for the initial term. (See definition of "Percentage Rent," Lease p. 1.) Section 4.3 
was not literally removed from the Lease, and the "Percentage Rent" definition, which 
was not marked "deleted," also remained part of the Lease for possible application during 
the renewal periods. "Zero" percentage rent is common during the initial term of a 
commercial lease because the parties have no record of what actual sales will be. With a 
record of sales established during the initial term, the parties can accurately set a 
percentage rent for subsequent terms. Accordingly, the fact that percentage rent was not 
applied during the initial term of the Lease does not preclude its application during the 
renewal periods. Little Caesar refers to no language in either the Lease or the option 
provision stating that rent during the option period will be the same as during the initial 
period, or that nonapplication of percentage rent for the initial term would necessarily 
carry over into the option period. Rather, the option rental is governed exclusively by the 
option provision, which clearly states that "Minimum Rent" and total rent will be set at 
"market rates" "mutually agreed upon" by the parties. Those "market rates" clearly 
contemplate, or at least permit, an agreed component for percentage rent. 
B. Utah Case Law. 
Little Caesar disputes the application of governing case law, which holds that a 
lease renewal option is unenforceable in the absence of an agreed rental, or other terms to 
fix the rental with "certainty and definiteness." Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 
Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). Little Caesar attempts to distinguish Pingree on 
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the basis that the tenant there refused to pay the $900 "maximum total monthly rental," 
id. at 1320, while Little Caesar here "has agreed to pay the maximum amount that Bell 
Canyon could require," referring to the $11-maximum "Minimum Rent." (Br. of Aplee. 
16.) However, as demonstrated above by the language of the option provision, the $11 
rate is only the maximum "Minimum Rent," not the maximum total rent. Accordingly, 
Pingree is exactly on point and controlling here. Because the parties failed to agree on 
the "market rate" for total option rent, the option is void and unenforceable. 
Little Caesar also attempts to distinguish Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 
357 (Utah App. 1998), which held a lease renewal option unenforceable because it 
required future agreement of the parties on the percentage rent component of total rent, 
and the parties never agreed. Id. at 362-64. Little Caesar asserts that the option in the 
present case is sufficiently definite without agreement because it provides for "Minimum 
Rent . . . at a market rate . . . [that] shall not be higher than $ 11 per square foot." (Br. of 
Aplee. 15.) However, again, Little Caesar is erroneously equating "Minimum Rent" with 
total rent. The stated cap of $11 applies only to the "Minimum Rent," which, by 
definition and common usage, allows for the additional component of percentage rent to 
obtain total rent. Both "Minimum Rent" and total rent were to be set at "market rates" 
"mutually agreed" to by the parties. In the absence of such agreement or more definite 
terms, the option is "too vague and indefinite for specific performance." Brown's Shoe 
Fit, supra, at 365. 
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In summary, the plain language of the option requires mutual agreement on rental 
at market rates. No agreement was reached, and the option contains no mechanism for a 
court to impose a rental rate. Therefore, the option is unenforceable. Pingree and 
Brown's Shoe Fit, supra; Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 
(Utah 1996) (court cannot impose lease agreement when parties have "explicitly 
disagreed as to the essential terms thereof). 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE WHITTLE 
AFFIDAVIT TO INTERPRET THE UNAMBIGUOUS OPTION 
PROVISION. 
Little Caesar argues that the Whittle Affidavit was properly considered "to the 
extent that Bell Canyon's arguments created any ambiguity" in the option provision. (Br. 
of Aplee. 17.) In other words, Little Caesar concedes that the affidavit is admissible only 
to resolve ambiguity. However, ambiguity cannot be "created" by the arguments of a 
party; rather, ambiguity must be determined as a matter of law from the four corners of 
the document. See, e.g., Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996). 
Here, Little Caesar has never argued that the option provision is ambiguous, and the 
district court made no determination of ambiguity. Therefore, any consideration of the 
Whittle Affidavit was improper. Moreover, Little Caesar's argument that consideration 
of the affidavit is justified by ambiguity in the option provision amounts to a concession 
that the option lacks the "certainty and definiteness" to be enforced. The option cannot be 
both clear and ambiguous. 
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Little Caesar cites In re General Determination of Rights, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 
65, for the proposition that the district court has "broad discretion" in the admission of 
affidavits. (Br. of Aplee. 17.) However, that case did not deal with the parol evidence 
rule, but with challenges based on general rules of evidence. The parol evidence rule is 
not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of law. E.g., Payne v. 
Buechler, 628 P.2d 646, 649 (Mont. 1981); Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Alaska 
Diversified Contr., 734 P.2d 62, 63 n.l (Alas. 1987); Gulotta v. Triano, 608 P.2d 81, 82 
(Ariz. App. 1980). Therefore, the district court has no discretion to disregard the parol 
evidence rule in making a legal interpretation of a written contract. See Interwest Constr. 
v. Palmer, supra, at 1358-59 (question of ambiguity and legal interpretation are reviewed 
for correctness); Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89, fflj 13-14, 987 P.2d 48, 52. 
Finally, Little Caesar argues that extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine 
whether a contract is ambiguous, citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1995). In that case, Justice Durham proposed a new framework for contract 
analysis that would significantly narrow the parol evidence rule by permitting 
consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining whether ambiguity exists. Id. at 268. 
Justices Russon and Zimmerman noted the clear departure from established law in their 
dissenting opinions. Id. at 269 (Russon, J., dissenting); id. at 271 (Zimmerman, J., 
dissenting). However, in its very next parol evidence case, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 
supra, the Supreme Court "clarified" and returned to its long-established parol evidence 
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standards, requiring ambiguity to be determined onls lion,,, lln l..ur *, IHIIHS of (he 
conlraei, " vutli rxlriiisii ci idciic" fidniissihlr nnh after n legal determination that 
*\ .: ts. 923 P.2d 1358-59. The Palmer decision was unanimous, with Justice 
Durham concurring. Id. at 1360. The Supreme Court has never again cited or ru i ea on 
the standard proposed in Ward. Rather, the Court continue^ u . 
correct standard "clarified" ii :i P< time) 5 eef e.g , Di r< m i :" -•' * 9 8 7 
- mosed Ward standard is an aberration in the case law that 
this Court should disregard.1 
In summary, the district court erred by admitting, and refusing to strike, the 
Whittle Affidav I me option pi * :•• ^ \ .-. ' * -h- s^ 
"certainly anil - " " • v>> K • •• -^ \ veordm^ly, ii the provision ia 
deemed ambiguous, the correct decision is not to consider extrinsic evidence, but to hold 
the option void and unenforceable as a matter of law. See Pingree and Brown's Shoe Fit, 
supra. 
1
 Alternatively, Ward is distinguishable on the grounds that the affidavit presented there did not 
contradict the parties' written agreement. 907 P.2d at 269. By contrast, the Whittle Affidavit does 
contradict the written option provision by asserting that the maximum total option rent was to be $11 j>er 
square foot, with no application of percentage rent. fl[ 11.) Accordingly, the Whittle Affidavit is 
inadmissible even under the proposed Ward standard. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the order of summary judgment 
for Little Caesar and enter judgment for Bell Canyon on the grounds that the option 
provision is void and unenforceable. In addition, the Court should reverse the award of 
attorney fees to Little Caesar and award attorney fees for both trial and appeal to Bell 
Canyon as the prevailing party under the attorney fee provision of the Lease. 
Respectfully submitted this £f day of June, 2000. 
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